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Impacts of Savings Groups Programs on Household  
Welfare in Laos: Case Study of the Vientiane Vicinity  
during the Mid-2000s
Kongpasa Sengsourivong* and Mieno Fumiharu**
Based on original household survey on the six villages in Vientiane vicinity in 2005, 
the paper investigates the impact of Savings Groups (SGs) programs on household 
income, expenditure, and asset, applying the methodology of Coleman’s (1999) 
study on Thailand to address placement bias and endogeneity problem.
The results revealed that SGs programs brought certain changes; SGs boosted 
educational expenditures implying activation of human capital formation, increased 
the house asset suggesting villagers’ investment reflected by possible business 
activation, and brought a possible shift in income sources from traditional agriculture 
to livestock raising.
The paper interprets these different results from Coleman (ibid.) in two pos-
sible ways; First the Laotian case is to an extent, free from a bias associated with 
seed capital allocation, therefore is more suitable to capture the effect than Thailand, 
and second it is since the stage of financial accessibility in Laos is far less developed 
than in Thailand.
Keywords: Laos, poverty reduction, estimation bias, micro lending, savings groups
I Introduction
Since the late 1980s, the Laotian government has regarded microfinance and improved 
access to finance in rural areas as major tools for alleviating poverty.  The government 
advanced microfinance as a priority program for agriculture and forestry under the 
National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy in 2004.  Since 1987, the government 
or foreign donors have implemented broad microfinance initiatives under numerous 
development projects.
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In reality, however, microfinance in Lao PDR remains shallow despite donors  having 
significantly invested in microfinance programs during the 2000s.  According to the 
Microfinance Capacity Building and Research Programme (2005), one million economi-
cally active Laotians potentially need formal or semi-formal financial services, but only 
one-quarter gained access to them.  For the estimated 300,000 Laotians who accessed 
loans and savings services, accessibility to formal financial services remains limited: 21% 
received microcredit from formal sources, 33% from semi-formal financing sources and 
project initiatives, and 46% from informal sources.
Since the early 2000s, however, one source of microfinance—savings groups (SGs), 
also called Credit Union or Village Banks—has spread around urban locales such as 
Vientiane or Luang Phabang.  Usually established in villages, SGs mobilize savings from 
member households to provide loans.  SGs typically operate under a cooperative system 
to improve members’ lives and extract them from poverty.  Most SGs around Vientiane 
receive technical support from the Small and Rural Development Project for Women and 
the Capacity Building Project for Women and Community, co-organized by the Central 
Lao Women’s Union, the Foundation for Integrated Agricultural Management (FIAM), 
and the Community Organizations Development Institute of Thailand (CODI).
This paper evaluates whether Laotian SG programs during the mid-2000s meet their 
primary objective of alleviating poverty.  Most of the poor and lower-income Laotians 
join microfinance programs seeking opportunities to save and borrow at rates more 
reasonable than those charged by informal moneylenders.  Our study expects and hypoth-
esizes that longstanding members of SGs may improve their living in terms of asset, 
income, and expenses.
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses earlier studies and the obser-
vation target of our analysis.  Section 3 explains our survey design, and section 4 demon-
strates our estimation methodology.  Section 5 examines the general picture with descrip-
tive statistics.  Section 6 examines the estimation results.  Section 7 concludes.
II Overview and Object
Few empirical studies have examined data for individual persons, households, communi-
ties, or institutions to assess whether microfinance is reducing poverty in Laos.  Further, 
studies that have investigated the poverty-reducing impact of microfinance programs in 
Bangladesh or Thailand suffer from selection bias and endogeneity (Pitt and Khandker 
1996; 1998; Pitt et al. 1999; Coleman 1999; 2002; Khandker 2003; Khandker et al. 1998; 
McKernan 2002; Morduch 1998).  In their pioneering study, Pitt and Khandker (1996; 
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1998) attempt to correct those two statistical problems in a study of Grameen Bank and 
two other group lending programs in Bangladesh.  Their quasi-experimental household 
survey of 87 villages randomly sampled SG members and non-members from villages 
with microfinance programs, and it randomly sampled households from villages without 
such programs.  Their studies evidenced a major problem in estimation methodology: 
When a dummy for credit program availability was applied as an identifying variable, 
endogeneity from program placement may have caused systematic variation between the 
two types of villages.  To address that problem, their estimation considers village fixed 
effects to control for unobserved variation between villages.  Nonetheless, their sampling 
of villages with SG programs may have included households ineligible for them,1) causing 
collinearity among village-specific dummy variables (or fixed-effect dummy variables) 
and program availability.
Khandker (2003) addressed the problem by expanding the dataset into panel data 
via a follow-up survey of the same households he surveyed in 1998–99.  He controlled 
self-selection bias using the criteria of eligibility for SG membership at the earliest period 
sample.  Per Coleman (1999), however, such criteria are ambiguous in practice, and this 
method faces serious limitations.
Coleman (ibid.) sought to evade selection bias without exogenous membership cri-
teria by creating a unique data-collecting survey methodology that applies straightforward 
estimation techniques.  His survey was conducted among SG members and non-members 
in 14 villages in Northeast Thailand in 1995–96.  Six of those villages that received NGO 
support to run SGs for less than one year were identified as “control” villages.  There, a 
self-selection process arose on whether to join SGs, while the impact of the program was 
not realized.  The remaining eight villages where SGs had operated for more than two 
years were defined as “treatment” villages.2)  A comparison between members of “old” 
SGs in treatment villages and “new” members in control villages could be undertaken. 
To estimate SGs’ impact, Coleman used variations in the length of time programs that 
were available in the treatment villages.  Based on empirical evidence, it concludes that 
most studies endorsing positive impact of microfinance found in Northeast Thailand may 
be merely seeming identifications occurred from selection bias or endogenous program 
replacement.
We follow Coleman’s (ibid.) methodology for two reasons.  First, it is the most suit-
able for considering the two bias problems, given the data available for the vicinity sur-
1) Many programs excluded households that owned more than 0.5 acres of land.
2) Among the eight villages, one is an exception because the SG began operating immediately after 
the first survey.
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rounding Vientiane.3)  Second, SG programs we observed closely resembled those in 
Coleman (ibid.).  SG programs in our study were initiated by the same NGO as in 
 Coleman (ibid.).  An NGO, FIAM in Thailand organized SGs in rural Northeast Thailand 
during the 1990s.  Together with another NGO, CODI, the practice was exported to vil-
lages in the Vientiane vicinity in the 2000s.
Practices of SGs in Northeast Thailand and Laos slightly differ.  According to Ohno 
and Patcharin (2009) and Ohno’s first paper in this special issue, FIAM usually introduced 
its programs to existing SGs instead of establishing new institutions, and it gave them 
seed money to strengthen their savings functions.  Because seed money was allocated 
based on the number of SGs’ members regardless of mobilized savings amounts, the 
impact of seed money may vary among SGs villages.  Accordingly, the distinction between 
new and old SGs/villages in Northeast Thailand is vague.  In addition, while the program 
con tains function as pure credit providers similar to Grameen Bank type microfinance, 
its effect is possibly intermingled with that from SGs’ own saving resources.  In contrast, 
NGOs generally started Laotian SGs without seed money, and SGs gradually accumulated 
lendable funds from members’ savings.  Considering the differences in the two cases, 
Coleman’s (1999) methodology is better suited to Laos.  We expect to capture clearer 
evidence using his methodology even though it did not present compelling evidence 
concerning Northeast Thailand.
We surveyed 251 households in six villages in a semi-urban area of the Naxaithong 
District 16 kilometers from Vientiane.  The six villages contained old SGs that had oper-
ated for more than one year or new SGs established more recently.  In all six, villagers 
self-selected to become SG members; the survey sampled members and non-members. 
Members were classified into a “treatment” group who had obtained credit or received 
dividends from their SG and a “control” group who had received no such benefits.  The 
effects upon SG members in the treatment group can be compared with SG members in 
the control group.  We used the period of membership as basic information in the impact 
estimation.  Finally, using non-member households in all six villages as samples, we 
implemented fixed-effects village estimations to control for endogeneity from program 
placement.  This survey design facilitates straightforward assessment of how SG pro-
grams influence household welfare.
3) The location was selected because most of Laos’s 357 SGs are in and around Vientiane (Microfinance 
Capacity Building and Research Project, 2003, cited in Chansathith [2004, 7]).
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III Interview Survey
During the period of our survey in 2005–06, 357 SGs operated throughout Lao PDR, 
primarily in and around the capital, assisted and monitored by one of seven agencies.4)  A 
significant number of SGs operated in Vientiane.  We conducted interviews concerning 
the microfinance project launched by the Women and Community’s Empowering Project 
in three semi-urban districts of the capital.  From these three districts we selected vil-
lages in the Naxaithong District for observation.
A survey was conducted in September 2005 for 251 households in six villages that 
had their own SGs.  Three villages had recently established new SGs, two had SGs that 
had been organized three months earlier and one village’s SG had operated only for one 
month.  Three villages had “old” SGs that had operated from slightly more than one year 
to almost three years.  These surveyed villages were selected from the list provided by 
project administrators.  Three “new” SGs were selected based on the distance condition 
in a way that the three old SGs were located not far, within 15 kilometers, from the three 
new SGs.
Table 1 summarizes the sampled SGs/villages.  The percentage of member house-
holds varies between 40–89% and is seemingly unrelated to whether the SGs were old 
or new.  We assured that our survey randomly sampled one-quarter of all households 
(24.4%).  Old and new SGs have members who have been benefitted by obtaining credit 
or receiving dividends and those who have not received financial benefits from SGs. 
4) The District Lao Women’s Union, District Lao Youth’s Union, District Planning Office, District 
Social Welfare Office, District Finance Office, District Agriculture and Forestry Office, and branches 
of the Agricultural Promotion Bank (Chansathith 2004).
Table 1 Sample
No. Savings Groups
Vintage No. of 
HH in 
Village





















I. Old savings group in:
1 Nakountay village Oct-2002 37 months 215 186 86.5 29 39 3 19 61 28.4%
2 Huannamyene village Jun-2003 27 months 353 217 61.5 136 34 1 13 48 13.6%
3 Dongluang village Apr-2004 17 months 184 75 40.8 109 16 0 8 24 13.0%
Sub-total 752 478 274 89 4 40 133 17.7%
II. New savings group in:
4 Phonekeo village Jun-2005 3 months 95 80 84.2 15 8 19 6 33 34.7%
5 Phonesavanh village Jun-2005 3 months 123 56 45.5 67 19 9 17 45 36.6%
6 Sisavard village Aug-2005 1 month 59 53 89.8 6 15 20 5 40 67.8%
Sub-total 277 189 88 42 48 28 118 42.6%
Grand total 1,029 667 362 131 52 68 251 24.4%
Source: Author’s survey data, September 2005 and March 2006.
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Following Coleman (1999), we defined the first set as the treatment group and second 
as the control group for empirical analysis.
Our three-part survey questionnaires followed Hulme and Mosley (1996)5) with 
slight modifications to fit purposes of our study.  The first part pertained to member and 
non-member households in the six villages.  It contained questions about household 
characteristics, including assets, income, expenditures, deposits, and borrowing.  Some 
questions about assets, income, and expenditures inquired into households’ financial 
situations during two periods: on the survey date in September 2005 and five years ear-
lier.  For each member and non-member household, we interviewed an adult or head of 
household at home concerning household finances.6)
The second part of the questionnaire sought village-specific information such as 
schools or prices of goods.  We interviewed the head of the village and members of each 
village SG’s committee.
The third part of the questionnaire gathered general information about SGs.  It 
included questions regarding the number of members, sources of funds, SGs’ deposit 
balances, deposit and credit methods, and resolving bad debts.
Third-year students in economics and business management at the National Uni-
versity of Laos conducted the household surveys.  They were trained and supervised by 
one of the authors in September 2005.  One of the authors conducted the village surveys 
and in-depth interviews with the SG group committees.  In addition, a follow-up survey 
in March 2006 with the chief of the Lao Women’s Union for the Naxaithong District col-
lected supplementary data about villages’ and SGs’ characteristics.  Secondary data from 
summary reports, progress reports, and SG manuals were obtained from the project, 
municipal arms of the Lao Women’s Union, and SG group committees.
IV Estimation Model
This section discusses the model specifications and methodology with which we tested 
the hypothesis that long-term SG members enjoy a higher quality of life as measured by 
asset, income, and expense.
5) Chanhsana (2004) conducted a similar study of Laotian microfinance in Saithani.  It was reproduced 
in Mosley’s (2001) study of microfinance and poverty in Bolivia.
6) Most interviewees were females (wives) because, per Laotian custom, wives generally oversee 
household income and expenses.  As Sheck-Sandbergen and Choulamany-Khampoui noted about 
Laotian females, “Women are generally good at financial management and accounting because of their 
social and economic experience in managing the household finances and the local economy: they 
are the sellers, buyers, traders, middle-women and entrepreneurs” (in Kunkel and Seibel [1997, 116]).
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IV-1 Model Specification
As discussed in Pitt and Khandker (1996) and Coleman (1999), the presiding difficulties 
in estimating the impact of microfinance programs arise from selection bias and endo-
genous placement of the program.  Consider the following estimation specification:
Cij = Xijβc + Vjγc + ε
c
ij (1)




Cij : the level of SG program participation,
Xij : a vector of household characteristics (e.g., age and education of household head),
Vj : a vector of village characteristics (e.g., prices and community infrastructure).
Traditional estimation of Equation (2) usually yields biased parameter estimates because 
ε yij and ε
c
ij are correlated.  As Coleman (ibid.) illustrated, the correlation between ε
y
ij and 
ε cij arises through selection bias because households with attributes Xij and Vj were moti-
vated to join SGs, whereas others were not.  For example, if many entrepreneurial house-
holds join SGs, the unmeasured factor “entrepreneurship” affects their decision to join 
and measures their income, expenditures, and assets.  In addition, ε yij and ε
c
ij may be 
correlated across villages if SG program placement is not random.  As Coleman (ibid.) 
highlighted, ε yij and ε
c
ij can be correlated if program placement is affected by villages’ socio-
economic factors such as conditions more suited to entrepreneurship, civic organ ization, 
dynamic leadership, or poverty-provoking situations (e.g., living in flood plains or 
drought-prone areas).
Better ways to cope with the statistical problem may include using a panel sample 
set or proper instrument variables.  However, both methods are infeasible, and even a 
panel dataset does not resolve bias completely, thus Coleman (ibid.) proposed a primitive 
but interesting alternative, which we basically adopted.  To collect an appropriate sample 
of households that are long-time SG members, households that recently joined SGs, and 
households that have not joined SGs, we surveyed two types of villages: those where 
SGs have operated for a long period (the old villages) and those where SGs were recently 
established (the new villages).  In the old villages most member households have enjoyed 
the benefit in forms of credit or dividend, whereas in the new villages many new members 
have remained unbenefitted yet.  The survey identified three types of households asso-
ciated with SGs.
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1) Treatment Group: SG member households who have benefitted as SG members 
in both old and new villages.
2) Control Group: SG member households who have recently participated SGs, and 
have not yet benefitted mainly in the new villages.
3) Non-Members: SG non-members in sampled villages.7)
In the estimation process, combining a dummy variable for SG membership (M), isolates 
non-members, and a dummy for members who benefitted from SG membership elimi-
nates the self-selection and endogenous placement biases, as follows.
Yij=Xijα + Vjβ + Mijγ + Tijδ + υij, (3)
where
Mij : a membership dummy equal to 1 if household ij self-selected SG membership 
and 0 otherwise.
Tij : a dummy variable equal to 1 if a self-selecting household has already benefitted 
as an SG member and 0 otherwise.
δ	 : measures the average impact of SGs on Yij.
In practice, our sample gives a better proxy for Tij.  The empirical model in Equation (3) 
can be improved by recognizing that some treatment members have benefitted longer 
than others from SG membership.  Our survey design captured SGs that operated in the 
six villages from one month to three years.  In these six villages, some households 
belonged to relatively old SGs, and their span of membership varied with the age of the 
SGs.  Taking into account that the cumulative effect that a member can utilize credit and 
receive dividend from their savings, grows over the life of the SG, one would expect to 
see greater impact in villages with older SGs.  The empirical model can be rewritten as
Yij = Xijα	 +Vjβ + Mijγ + MAMTijδ + μij, (4)
where the treatment dummy Tij is replaced by MAMTij, the number of months that the 
7) The identification of the treatment and the control group in this paper differs slightly from Coleman’s 
(1999).  Coleman (ibid.) distinguishes them based on the village type (old or new) households belong 
to; all the households in the old villages are defined as the treatment groups, whereas ones in the 
new are regarded as the control groups.  Our study, however, identifies the treatment and the 
control household based on the direct questionnaire inquiring if they have benefitted from partici-
pating in SGs both in the old and new villages.
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SG has operated in the village.  In other words, MAMTij can be construed as the number 
of months participants have benefitted from SG membership.  Now, δ measures the 
impact per month of program availability.  If the order of program placement, however, 
is not random with respect to unobservable village characteristics, then correlation 
between MAMTij and ε
y
ij can be eliminated with village fixed effects.  According to 
 Coleman (ibid.), this specification in Equation (4) is considerably easier to estimate (if 
Yij is uncensored, ordinary least squares [OLS] is appropriate).  If the order of program 
placement is random with respect to unobservable village characteristics, we can obtain 
efficient and unbiased estimates with Vj as a vector of specific village characteristics.
To carefully examine estimated impacts and possible biases, we compared the 
results of four types of estimations, following Coleman (ibid.).
1) The “Super-naïve” model: estimation without considering control variables for 
self-selection and non-random placement.
2) The “Naïve” model: estimation with a traditional variable controlling for self-
selection.  Here, the variable “land value owned by the household five years 
before this survey” is expected to absorb the participation incentive.
Our survey design enables us to employ the SG membership dummy to control self-
selection bias, since we prepare measures for the length of time that respondents 
belonged to SGs (months of membership) besides the dummy.  Because we must con-
sider the possibility of non-random placement, we prepared two types of estimations.
3) A “Non-fixed-effects” model: if program placement is random, the model with 
non-fixed-effects for village attribute generates efficient and consistent esti-
mators.
4) A “Fixed efficient” model: if program placement is not random, estimations by 
the non-fixed-effects model can be inconsistent.  Using a fixed-effects model 
associated with village attributes, we gain consistent (though possibly inefficient) 
estimators.
IV-2 Estimation Methodology
Assuming that dependent variables (household outcomes) are uncensored, we applied 
OLS for estimating Equation (4).  Moreover, we applied the White test for heteroskedas-
ticity, which leads to unbiased estimators of OLS.  Then we used generalized least 
squares (GLS) estimation to correct heteroskedasticity (weighted least squares estima-
tions per Wooldridge [2003, 268–276]).
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V Descriptive Observation
V-1 Sample Villages
Table 2 summarizes basic information for sampled villages.  The initial survey did not 
necessarily collect details about SGs/villages, as its objective was to collect household-
level data about expenditures, income, and assets.  As an alternative, we used data from 
Mieno and Chansathith (2014), who surveyed about 80 SGs around Vientiane, including 
all 6 of our surveyed villages, in September 2008.  Note that Table 2 shows data for 2008, 
three years after our 2005 survey period.  Table 2 suggests no notable distinction in 
primary source of livelihoods between old and new villages.  Dong Luang appears to be 
an exception among all six villages because non-agricultural activities are its primary 
livelihood; the remaining five villages are essentially rice-producing communities with 
some secondary income sources.
The bottom half of Table 2 indicates the purposes for SG loans, and the non- 
agricultural nature of Dong Luang indicates no clear differences about the comparison 
among Consumption, Durables, and Production; for example, purposes for borrowing in 
Dong Luang parallel those in Nakountay, a typical rice-producing village.  Data under the 
column Ground Average show little difference from that of 80 Sample Average.8)  Remark-
able differences in loan purposes appear between old and new SGs.  The column Old SGs 
Average indicates that 84.2% of loans were for production purposes during the surveyed 
period.  Among the new SGs, 51.7% of loans were for production purposes and 37.0% 
for consumption.  Among components of consumption lending by new SGs, average 
percentages for education (7.2%) and medical services (7.7%) are strikingly higher than 
for old SGs (0.2% and 0.4%, respectively).  Among new SGs, 40.6% of loans were for 
agricultural production versus 26.9% among old SGs, but old SGs issued a greater per-
centage of loans for business purposes (41.3% versus 10.7% for new SGs).
Data in Table 2 suggest that SGs lend to support members’ consumption during 
their early stages and shift to production lending as they age.  Agricultural lending dom-
inates lending for production during SGs’ early stages and shifts to business purposes. 
Table 2 shows the picture three years after our 2005 survey, when the three old SGs had 
operated one-and-a-half to three years.  Thus, we presume that SGs which were old in 
2005 were in a stage similar to new SGs during the 2008 period shown in Table 2.  That 
is, relatively young SGs mainly granted credit for such consumption purposes as educa-
tion or medical care.
8) It is the sample average of SGs surveyed in 2008 and the same as Table 5 in Mieno and Chansathith 
(2014).
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V-2 Independent Variables and Characteristics of the Sample Households
Table 3 summarizes variables representing household and village characteristics.  The 
sample contains 251 households: 131 (52%) in the treatment group, 52 (21%) in the 
control group, and 68 (27%) non-members.  Variables in Table 3 are generally utilized as 
independent variables in the estimation.  They are classified into four categories.
Section I.1 shows the length of SG member scaled by month.  The mean is 15 
months for the treatment group and 1 month for the control group and by definition 0 for 
non-members.
Section I.2 shows household characteristics.  Data in I2-3 and I2-4 indicate that, 
household heads are males in more than 90% of cases, whereas respondents to the 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variable





Number of Sample 251 131 52 68
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Mean Mean















I2-1 Member Dummy 0.73 0.45 1.00 1.00
I2-2 Value of household-owned land 5 years ago 29,043 82,224 25,346 36,662 30,338
I2-3 Sex of household head (female=1) 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.13 0.09
I2-4 Gender of respondents (female=1) 0.89 0.32 0.92 0.88 0.82
I2-5 Education of respondents (years) 4.90 3.00 4.69 5.27 5.01
I2-6 Household size 5.51 2.00 5.65 5.54 5.24
I2-7 Age of respondents (years) 41.0 12.0 42.3 38.6 41.0
I2-8 Number of months doing business 161 146 155 161 172.0
I2-9 Number of generations of family in village 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.51
I2-10 Number of relatives in village 2.42 4.00 2.27 2.21 2.87
I2-11 SGs committee member dummy 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.10 0
I2-12 Number of civil servant in Household 0.27 0.56 0.28 0.37 0.16
I2-13 Number of wage employment in Household 1.08 1.19 1.18 1.10 0.88
I2-14 Number of school age children in Household 1.57 1.26 1.67 1.83 1.19














I3-1 Village is near river (0/1) 0.43 0.5 0.56 0.08 0.47
I3-2 Village has big pond which has water throughout the year (0/1) 0.38 0.48 0.36 0.42 0.37
I3-3 Dummy for villages with a big pond or river access (0/1) 0.57 0.50 0.62 0.44 0.56
I3-4 Village is located in district capital (0/1) 0.10 0.29 0.12 0.00 0.12
I3-5 Dummy for villages with paved road or closeness to main road (0/1) 0.29 0.45 0.38 0.02 0.31
I3-6 Village has irrigation (0/1) 0.19 0.39 0.26 0.02 0.19
I3-7 Dummy for villages with secondary school 0.10 0.29 0.12 0.00 0.12
I3-8 Dummy for villages with primary school up to grade 5 0.66 0.47 0.74 0.44 0.68






















I4-1 Price of one cattle (1,000 kip) 1,610 233 1,574 1,679 1,629
I4-2 Price of one buffalo (1,000 kip) 3,261 524 3,271 3,135 3,338
I4-3 Price of pig per Kg 14,596 5,097 15,485 11,484 15,262
I4-4 Price of duck per Kg 14,572 617 14,668 14,356 14,551
I4-5 Price of local chicken (Gailard) per Kg 18,857 896 18,985 18,288 19,044
I4-6 Daily wage for harvesting rice 18,307 9,339 18,168 15,769 20,515
I4-7 Daily wage for planting rice 27,875 18,081 32,664 11,913 30,853
I4-8 Daily wage for construction 24,243 2,043 23,798 25,769 23,934
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interview (i.e., SG members) are mostly females.  The mean education year is 4.90 
years for the whole sample, 4.69 years for the treatment group, 5.27 years for the con-
trol group, and 5.01 years for non-members.  Table 3 suggests that internal networks 
influence participation in SGs as follows.  For the whole sample, villagers have an aver-
age of 2.42 relatives in the village; the average number of relatives is 2.27 for villagers 
in the treatment group, 2.21 in the control group, and slightly higher at 2.87 for non-
members.  The average number of civil servants per household is 0.27 for the whole 
sample, 0.28 for the treatment group, 0.37 for the control group, and 0.16 among non-
members.
Sections I.3 and I.4 report village characteristics and price factors, respectively. 
Data show that 40–50% of villages enjoy access to water.  Only 19% of villages have 
irrigation systems.  Two-thirds (66%) have a primary school, but only 10% have a second-
ary school.
V-3 Observation on the Dependent Variables
Table 4 presents three general categories of indices for household welfare as dependent 
variables: (A) Expenditures, (B) Assets, and (C) Income.  Household expenditures con-
sist of (A1) Food and (A2) Non-food Expenditures.  The latter contains seven subcatego-
ries, including Transportation, Education, and Medical expenditures.  Assets include (B1) 
House, (B2) Land, and (B3) Others.  Others contain five subsets, including Agricultural 
assets, Livestock, and Savings.  Household income includes (C1) Self-employment and 
(C2) Employment Income, subdivided into seven and five categories, respectively.  In 
total, we prepared 34 dependent variables.
Table 4 compares the mean values of dependent variables classified by treatment, 
control, and non-member groups.  The difference between mean values of the control 
group and non-members shows the possibility of participation bias.  That means the values 
for the treatment group exceed those for the control group in all three categories—
Expenditures, Assets, and Income—suggesting that SGs’ lending programs sponsor posi-
tive welfare effects.
Among Expenditures, the notable relationships are for Non-food Expenditures and 
in subcomponents such as Education, Clothing, and Medical.  Among Assets, the note-
worthy relationships are House and Land.  Among Income, on the other hand, SGs’ 
positive effect is suggested by wide ranges in Self-employment and Employment income.
A comparison between control groups and non-members suggests household mem-
bership in SGs.  Mean values for control groups are larger for Household Total Expen-
ditures and most of its subcomponents, suggesting that households with higher expen-
ditures have a larger tendency to be SG members.  The gap between Food and Non-food 
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Expenditures is more remarkable for non-members, suggesting the necessity for non-
food expenditures is an incentive to join SGs.
Regarding Assets, however, wealthier households appear inactive to join SGs.  In 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables
A. Household Monthly Expenditure
Sample Group Whole Treatment Group Control Group Non-member
Number of Sample 251 131 52 68
Mean % Std. Dev. Mean % Mean % Mean %
A Household total expenditure 1,234,800 1,152,860 1,340,880 1,283,097 993,507
A1 Food expenditure 417,481 33.8 329,570 429,160 32.0 435,058 33.9 381,539 38.4
A2 Non-food expenditure 817,319 66.2 998,698 911,720 68.0 848,039 66.1 611,968 61.6
A21 Rental 10,267 0.8 84,549 2,061 0.2 39,396 3.1 3,799 0.4
A22 Transportation 210,553 17.1 432,975 209,551 15.6 311,404 24.3 135,363 13.6
A23 Education 167,807 13.6 333,357 201,508 15.0 129,619 10.1 132,086 13.3
A24 Clothing 136,084 11.0 184,019 161,304 12.0 95,556 7.4 118,490 11.9
A25 Medical 105,106 8.5 234,065 119,523 8.9 88,875 6.9 89,745 9.0
A26 Utensil 95,754 7.8 222,659 98,393 7.3 104,131 8.1 84,265 8.5
A27 Other major expenditures 91,748 7.4 316,805 119,380 8.9 79,058 6.2 48,221 4.9
Note: Unit: kip, monthly expenditure
B. Household Asset
Sample Group Whole Treatment Group Control Group Non-member
Number of Sample 251 131 52 68
Mean % Std. Dev. Mean % Mean % Mean %
B Value of household owned total asset 92,679 94,156 69,466 108,000
B1 Household-owned house 33,965 36.6 45,450 36,757 39.0 33,009 47.5 29,316 27.1
B2 Household-owned land 45,479 49.1 43,987 46.7 22,100 31.8 66,232 61.3
B3 Household-owned other assets 13,235 14.3 33,073 13,412 14.2 14,356 20.7 12,037 11.1
B31 Agriculture asset 2,525 2.7 7,607 2,703 2.9 3,156 4.5 1,699 1.6
B32 Livestock asset 5,550 6.0 19,242 4,907 5.2 8,011 11.5 4,907 4.5
B33 Other enterprise asset 460 0.5 2,229 413 0.4 727 1.0 346 0.3
B34 Savings at house 1,242 1.3 7,491 1,078 1.1 575 0.8 2,069 1.9
B35 Other asset 3,459 3.7 14,567 4,312 4.6 1,887 2.7 3,017 2.8
Note: Unit: 1,000 kip
C. Household Income
Sample Group Whole Treatment Group Control Group Non-member
Number of Sample 251 131 52 68
Mean % Std. Dev. Mean % Mean % Mean %
C Household total income 14,346,752 14,439,282 11,932,355 16,014,800
C1 Household total self-employment income 11,592,111 80.8 25,294,651 11,487,380 79.6 9,626,000 80.7 13,297,368 83.0
C11 from agriculture 2,419,044 16.9 5,979,001 2,537,023 17.6 2,370,000 19.9 2,229,265 13.9
C12 from livestock 1,578,175 11.0 3,486,485 1,466,794 10.2 1,580,385 13.2 1,791,059 11.2
C13 from handicraft & textile 1,888,122 13.2 3,243,976 2,134,983 14.8 1,703,500 14.3 1,553,735 9.7
C14 from trading 3,376,932 23.5 18,386,628 2,664,695 18.5 3,952,885 33.1 4,308,603 26.9
C15 from repairing & fixing service 379,482 2.6 2,459,819 552,672 3.8 0 0.0 336,029 2.1
C16 from rice mill & construction 1,648,562 11.5 15,460,301 1,703,733 11.8 19,231 0.2 2,788,235 17.4
C17 from vehicle service 301,793 2.1 2,944,454 427,481 3.0 0 0.0 290,441 1.8
C2 Household total employment income 3,601,356 25.1 13,979,828 2,951,902 20.4 2,306,355 19.3 2,717,432 17.0
C21 wage & salary income 2,205,797 15.4 3,799,600 2,327,977 16.1 1,870,000 15.7 2,227,206 13.9
C22 from remittance 407,822 2.8 1,704,379 448,352 3.1 249,816 2.1 450,569 2.8
C23 rental income 79,084 0.6 738,221 102,290 0.7 113,462 1.0 8,088 0.1
C24 monetary items income 40,425 0.3 45,802 0.3 38,462 0.3 31,569 0.2
C25 other income 21,514 0.1 253,644 27,481 0.2 34,615 0.3 0 0.0
Note: Unit: kip, yearly income
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particular, the gap in the subcomponent of Land seems large (66,232 kip for non-members 
and 22,100 kip for the control group), suggesting that those richer in land asset are nota-
bly inactive to join SG activities.  In fact, this tendency is overwritten by the independent 
variable Value of Household-owned Land 5 Years Ago (Table 3, I2-2).  Similarly, House-
hold Total Income and all its subcomponents suggest that wealthier households generally 
appear inactive to join SGs.
VI Empirical Results
Equation (4) estimated the effect of SG membership duration, the SG membership 
dummy, ex ante household assets,9) and other independent variables on all 34 dependent 
variables associated with household expenditures, assets, and income (Table 4).
In a comparable setting with data for similar SGs in Northeast Thailand, Coleman 
(1999) insists that the effect of SG membership is scarcely evident in any welfare indices 
after considering selection and placement biases.  Although the influence of the SG par-
ticipation on welfare could not be found in most dependent variable cases, we found five 
dependent variables influenced by it covering assets, income, and expenditures.  Exam-
ining assets, we found a positive and significant result for (1) Household-owned House. 
With regard to income, we found correlations among subcomponents of Self-employment 
Income from (2) Livestock (positive) and (3) Agriculture (negative).  Among Expendi-
tures, we found correlations in variables for (4) Rental and (5) Education.
We now analyze estimation results for these five cases (Table 5).  For all five, the 
effect of SG membership duration is significant—positive for four dependent variables 
and negative for agricultural income.  Data for (1) House Asset suggests that SG credit 
has an improvement effect directly or indirectly.  Positive results for income from (2) 
Livestock and negative results for (3) Agricultural income may suggest that SG members 
borrow to raise livestock and that lending for that purpose promotes a shift from tradi-
tional farming.  The result for (4) Rental expenditures suggests that SG lending enables 
members to activate the livelihood activities in agriculture or non-agriculture.  The result 
for (5) Education suggests that SG lending enables members to pursue education.
In Table 5, estimation results for Value of Household-owned Land 5 Years Ago, the 
variable for absorbing selection bias between the Super Naïve model and others, are 
significant only for agricultural income, but the effect of SG membership duration remains 
9) This value stands for the value of house with land (not empty land or land for rice fields and crops). 
Barnes (1996, 4) cited houses as one of the physical assets representing household wealth.
Kongpasa Sengsourivong and MIENO F.100
positive after controlling for it.  Some household characteristics are significant as control 
variables, but others are not.  Variables representing village characteristics and wage/
price variables are seldom significant.
VI-1 Impact on Assets: Household House Asset
Among the category Household Assets in Table 4, estimation results confirm that House-
hold-owned House is a primary component (36.6%) of total household assets.  In Table 
6, F-statistics for all four model specifications are strongly significant.  In all four speci-
fication regressions, the coefficient of Months as SG Member is positive and significant. 
A large proportion of coefficients in both the Naïve and Super-naïve models show sig-
nificant impact.  In the fixed-effect and non-fixed-effect models, which control possible 
placement bias, the coefficient of Months as SG Member is lower, but significant at 5% 
and 10%, respectively.  These results sharply contrast with those in Coleman (1999; 
2002), which shows insignificant effects of SG membership on house value.
The coefficient for Value of Household-owned Land 5 Years Ago (Table 6) is positive, 
but statistically insignificant in three specifications, implying that selection bias in a form 
Table 5 Summery of the Estimation Result
Independent Variable
Asset Income Expenditure
Table 5 Table 6 Table 7 Table 8 Table 9
House 
Asset Livestock Agriculture Education Rental
Months as SGs member (duration as SGs member) ** + * + *** – ** + ** +
SGs Member Dummy * +
Value of household-owned land 5 years ago *** +
Sex of household head (female=1) *** –
Gender of respondents (female=1) ** +
Education of respondents (years) ** + ** – ** +
Household size *** + *** + *** +
Age of respondents (years) ** + *** +
Number of months doing business *** + *** + ** + ** +
Number of generations of family in village ** + ** – *** +
Number of relatives in village *** + ** +
SGs committee member dummy *** + *** + ** +
Number of civil servant in household * + ** +
Dummy for villages with a big pond or river access * +
Dummy for villages with paved road or closeness to main road ** +
Dummy for villages with primary school up to grade 5 * +
Distance from village to main markets *** +
Price of local chicken (Gailard) per Kg
Daily wage for construction
Note: Based on the non-fixed effects model.  The superscripts ***, ** and * denote that coefficient is signifi-
cant at 1%, 5% and 10% criteria.
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that the initial wealth affects the house asset at observation period is trivial and can be 
ignored.10)
The coefficient of SG Member Dummy with respect to house asset value is insig-
nificant, consistent with Coleman (1999; 2002), indicating that unobservable differences 
between members and non-members (such as entrepreneurship and preferences) make 
no difference.  Therefore, in the fixed- and non-fixed effects models, Table 6 indicates no 
correlation between Member Dummy and house asset value, also suggesting no selection 
bias caused by unobservables.
Comparing the fixed- and non-fixed-effects models in Table 6, the effect of Months 
as SG Member is inconsequential; the statistical significance is slightly weak in the non-
fixed-effects model, and coefficients are almost identical.  For the explanatory variables 
to control village attributes in the non-fixed-effects, Naïve, and Super-naïve models, and 
the factor for paved roads is negative and statistically significant.  The result roughly 
shows that the fixed-effects model sufficiently absorbs differences among villages and 
any effect of endogenous program placement is unclear.
Estimation results show significant influence of several household characteristics 
on house asset.  Although the Sex of Household Head (female) dummy in Table 3 is 
insignificant, at least at the 10% level, the dummy for Gender of Respondents (Table 3) 
shows a positive and significant relation to house value in all four estimation models. 
Education of Respondents is highly significant in all four estimation models at the 5% 
level, which indicates that human and physical capital are complements in production 
(Coleman 1999, 120).  Age of Respondents, Number of Months Doing Business, Number 
of Relatives in Village, and SG Committee Member Dummy are significant and positive 
in most specifications.
VI-2 Impact on Income: Income from Livestock and Agriculture
Unlike the examination of assets, we could hardly found the evidence of the overall impact 
for improvement by the SG membership in the income side.  Results for regressions 
involving self-employment and employment income are insignificant.  However, evidence 
of a certain change in composition of household livelihoods was suggested in the estima-
tions: participation in SGs decreases the composition of agricultural income and slightly 
increases that of livestock income.
In Table 7, the effect of SG membership on income from livestock is positive in all 
four specifications: coefficients for Months as SG Member are positive and significant in 
10) This result also contrasts with those in Coleman (1999), who finds the coefficient of “female-owned 
land value 5 years ago” to be positive and statistically significant with regard to women’s wealth.
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the fixed-effects and non-fixed-effects models (at 10% significance), implying that SG 
participation increases livestock production.  On the other hand, in all four specification 
models, agriculture income (Table 8) correlates significantly and negatively with months 
of SG membership.  Results are significant at 1% in all models, suggesting the negative 
correlation is stable.
The member dummy is significant for agricultural income, implying that unobserv-
able differences between members and non-members matter in estimation results, 
whereas they are insignificant for livestock income.  Although estimations for agricultural 
income find correlations with many explanatory variables for household characteristics 
such as household size (positive) or education (negative), only a few explanatory variables 
influence livestock income.  Village characteristics seldom influence the condition.
As summarized in Table 4, agricultural income averages 16.9% of total income in 
the whole sample, and livestock income averages 11.0%.  Both are major income sources 
for village households.  Our finding shows that membership in SGs is associated with a 
progression in village livelihoods from agriculture to livestock production.  These results 
contrasted with results for Northeast Thailand.  Coleman (1999) discovered nothing about 
the impact of SG membership on income and income structure.  Our finding, however, 
is unclear.  The positive correlation of SG membership with livestock income is signifi-
cant only at 10%, and such substitution relation does not necessarily appear consistent 
with the descriptive observation in Table 4 (columns C11 and C12).
VI-3 Impact on Expenditure: Education and Rental Expenditure
We found no clear overall impact of SG membership on total expenditures (Table 4).  But 
the clear and positive correlation between SG membership and educational expenditures 
is a noteworthy finding.  Education expenditures average 13.6% of total expenditures, 
the second-largest component of Non-food Expenditure.  SG members borrow for educa-
tion—that is for human capital formation.
Table 9 shows the impact of SG membership on education expenditures with the 
four specifications.  Months as SG Member relates positively at 5% significance in all 
specifications except in the Super-naïve model.  Per results in the fixed-effects model, 
belonging to an SG for one more month could raise educational expenditures by 5,670 
kip, for example.
As for the comparison among four specifications in Table 9, the SG Membership 
Dummy and Value of Household-owned Land 5 Years Ago are insignificant, suggesting 
negligible bias from unobservables.  Among variables for village characteristics, Villages 
with a Primary School up to Grade 5 correlates positively and significantly with educa-
tional expenditures.
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As a supplemental finding, we note a clear but substantially weak correlation 
between SG membership and rental expenditures.  Table 10 shows the regression results 
on rental expenditures for all specifications.  The coefficient is significant at 1% for the 
Super-naïve model and 5% for the remaining specifications.  This result could be evidence 
that SG membership facilitates self-employment in raising livestock and fish or in non-
agricultural activities.  At 0.8% of total expenditures, the effect of Rental expenditures 
is, however, limited.  For rental expenditures, the explanatory variable of education level 
is positive and significant at the 5% level in all four estimation models.  This result may 
imply that better-educated Laotians launch or expand new business by acquiring physical 
capital through SG credit.
VI-4 Interpretation
Our finding suggests that SG programs around Vientiane generally encourage diversifi-
cation on household livelihoods.  First, SGs’ strong positive contribution to educational 
expenditures is apparent and confirmed in the fixed- and non-fixed-effects models, the 
strictest forms of estimation.  The apparent difference in mean values for the amount and 
share of educational expenditures between the treatment group and others (control group 
and non-members) in Table 4 underwrites the estimation results.  As Table 2 shows, 
education loans are one of the largest components of lending among young SGs, suggest-
ing that increase of educational expenditures is realized through loosened cash constraint 
by SG loan as a direct effect.  Supporting human capital formation beyond short-term 
income generation is the most vital service SGs provide during their early stages.
Second, we find that SG microfinance is associated with an increase in house values. 
There are two ways to interpret this finding.  As a direct way, it can be realized by invest-
ment for a particular purpose such as starting or expanding a business; as an indirect way 
it can be a result of income generation.  Table 2 indicates that loans for durables, includ-
ing house repair, are a somewhat higher percentage of loans among young SGs, suggest-
ing the existence of the direct effect; investment in housing is activated by improved 
access to credit.
Third, results for increased livestock income and decreased agricultural income 
imply that households gravitate toward livestock raising beyond their traditional agricul-
tural pursuits.  However, the result is not necessarily consistent with the descriptive 
observation.  In Table 4, income from livestock among the treatment group is somehow 
less than among the control group, and non-members (although it is consistent in income 
from agriculture).  Also, Table 2 suggests that lending for agricultural purposes is rela-
tively robust among young SGs.  Any effect SGs have in changing household income 
sources from traditional agriculture to more diversified livelihoods remains vague.
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Finally, the impact on rental expenditures gives side evidence that SGs encourage 
entrepreneurship.  However, the share of rental income among total income is low (0.6% 
in Table 4), so the effect is trivial and caution is warranted in interpreting this result.
Although this study’s primary contribution is fact-finding relevant to Laos, several 
factors distinguish Laos from Thailand in Coleman (1999).  From a methodological per-
spective, characteristics of SGs differ, as Ohno and Patcharin (2009) and Ohno’s first 
paper in this special issue indicate.  Since NGO programs in Northeast Thailand started 
by supporting existing SGs, information about members of new groups (membership 
dummy=1 and duration=0 months) may not provide pure signals of the control group. 
In addition, since programs distributed seed money regardless of SGs’ mobilized saving 
size, seed money may be significant for some SGs and trivial for others, resulting that 
the impact for the treatment group contained such serious disturbance factors.
In this sense, the methodology may better fit the Laotian case.  Since NGOs began 
SGs in Laos the new SGs/villages are truly new.  Seed money, a serious disturbing factor 
in analyzing Thailand’s case, is rarely distributed among programs in the Vientiane area. 
In a socio-economic context, the stage of the village economy may offer an explanation. 
Thailand’s rural economy was well developed and diversified even in the mid-1990s, and 
a degree of formal credit had reached even rural areas.  However, only about three-
quarters of Lao PDR’s one million working population can access formal or semi-formal 
financial services.  Moreover, only 6% of credit-eligible borrowers could benefit from 
reasonable interest rates, and 4% of them deposit money in formal financial institutions 
(Microfinance Capacity Building and Research Programme 2005).11)  Given this situation, 
SGs were a vital and nearly the sole (except for informal finance) providers of financial 
services during mid-2000s, even in the semi-urban area surrounding Vientiane.
VII Conclusion
Coleman (1999) raised the possibility of selection bias and endogenous placement of 
program in pioneering studies such as Pitt and Khandker (1996; 1998) and Khandker 
(2003).  He tackled the problem with a unique sample design in examining SGs in North-
east Thailand.  He found that many apparent correlations were caused by biases between 
the program and welfare factors, and warned that earlier studies may overestimate the 
impact of microfinance.
Following Coleman’s (1999) survey design and estimation methodology, we found 
11) Agricultural Promotion Bank, the largest policy-based bank.
Kongpasa Sengsourivong and MIENO F.110
that SG microfinance bolsters household income, expenditures, and assets in Laos.  We 
estimated the influence of SGs on 34 welfare indices, about half the number (72) in the 
benchmark study.  Although Coleman (ibid.) universally denied any causal impact in all 
of his observations, our estimations indicate an impact in five index cases on assets, 
income, and expenditures.
We found that SGs boost educational expenditures as a major function.  We also 
found an increase in assets (house asset), suggesting villagers’ investment (purchase of 
durables and house repair) reflected by possible business activation or agricultural diver-
sification.  Although a convincing interpretation is difficult, our estimations suggest that 
SG microfinance prompts a shift in income sources from traditional agriculture to live-
stock raising, and an increase in rental income.
Our findings are basically consistent to the argument on the function of SGs in 
Vientiane areas discussed in other papers of this issue, and strongly support the existence 
of the benefit of the SG practice in Laos.  Our findings also endorse the Laotian govern-
ment’s current policies regarding SGs.  Future scholarship needs to examine whether 
our findings can be generalized to situations in Laos beyond Vientiane’s socio-economic 
context.
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